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Abstract—We propose a futures-based resource trading scheme
via a forward contract to tackle the risk of trading failure
and unfairness associated with the on-site negotiation process in
facilitating resource sharing in wireless networks. More specif-
ically, the resource requester and the resource owner negotiate
a mutually beneficial forward contract in advance, where the
agreement between the two parties are based on the historical
statistics related to the resource supply and demand. The risk
of trading failure is utilized to determine the contract price
and resource amount. Spectrum trading between two different
service providers is studied as an example and simulation results
show that the proposed futures-based resource trading scheme
achieves better performance in terms of success rate and fairness
compared with the traditional on-site mechanism.
Index Terms—Futures, forward contract, resource trading,
success rate, fairness.
I. Introduction
TECHNOLOGY advancements on sensing, communica-tions, and computing directly accelerate the recent de-
velopment of Internet of Things (IoT), leading to rich and
diverse applications in industry and business processes [1].
For enabling IoT applications, smart devices and networks rely
on the capabilities for information collection, processing and
tight collaboration with their neighbors. However, the rapid
proliferation of IoT devices and real-time IoT applications re-
sult in dramatically increased demand for communication and
computing resources, posing a significant challenge for the un-
derlying resource constrained wireless networks. Due to their
resource constraint, it is extremely difficult for such devices
and networks to meet stringent requirements of many real-
time IoT applications. To overcome these challenges, resource
sharing among IoT devices and networks has been studied as
an effective solution by exploiting unused resources [2].
However, one major difficulty of the resource sharing is how
to design an incentive mechanism by encouraging the selfish
resource owners to fully share their under-utilized resources
with others. As a result, resource trading has been studied to
enable resource selling and buying among resource owners
and resource requesters.
To enable resource trading, price and amount for resource
sharing need to be negotiated among different trading entities
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to maximize the revenue of the resource owners while meeting
the demands of requesters. Most studies in this area utilize on-
site trading [3]–[5], where negotiations, including the trading
price and resource amount, are based on the dynamic available
resource and changing network conditions. All requesters
compete with each other for the shared resources in the on-site
trading market via game theory (e.g., auction and Stackelberg
game) [3], [5]. As a result, some requesters have the risk of
failure to access the resources, leading to the violation of QoS.
Additionally, with the random nature of available resource
and demand, on-site resource trading often features drastically
fluctuating price and inevitable unfairness due to stringent
trading latency requirement in the real-time IoT applications.
In order to reduce the probability of trading failure while
improving the trading fairness, futures-based resource trading
scheme in real-time IoT networks is proposed in this letter.
Futures refers to a forward contract that different entities agree
to buy or sell a product at a specific price in the future [6], and
has been widely adopted in financial and commodity exchange
to reduce the risk of dynamic price and resource availability
ahead of the actual transaction [7], [8]. Different from the
existing on-site resource trading, the proposed new futures-
based resource trading scheme regulates the price and quantity
prior to the on-site request through a mutually beneficial
forward contract, while considering the uncertainty of resource
supply and demand. Specifically, the utility of the resource
owner and the resource requester are formulated according
to the dynamic network conditions. The price and amount
of the futures contract are set based on the risk estimation
for trading failure, which is incurred by the dynamic resource
availability and network conditions. Spectrum trading between
two different service providers is studied to evaluate the
proposed futures-based trading mechanism.
II. Futures-Based Resource Trading Scheme
Futures-based resource trading scheme is first presented in
this Section. Spectrum trading is then studied as an example
to illustrate the risk analysis and contract establishment.
A. Futures-Based Resource Trading Scheme
Resource trading is an effectively approach to exploit under-
utilized resources to meet the requirements of real-time IoT
applications in resource constrained networks. However, the
existing resource trading scheme determines price and amount
for resource trading via on-site auction and game-theoretic
approach. In that case, some urgent requesters have high risk
of unable to obtain the resources on time. Furthermore, On-site
2trading could also bring trading unfairness due to imbalanced
resource availability and demand. Therefore, futures-based
resource trading is proposed to address these issues, in which
the resource requester and the resource owner negotiate a
mutually beneficial forward contract on the trading price and
amount in advance. The utilities of the two trading sides
are random because of the changing resource availability and
demand. In this letter, the trading statistics is assumed to be
known based on the historical records. The risk of trading
failure is analyzed to determine the fair resource price and
amount of the futures-based contract. In IoT networks, the
risk may come from the randomness of resource availability,
dynamic demand, varying channel quality, and so on. The
contract requester will access the shared resource based on
the mutually beneficial agreement.
B. Resource Trading Model for Spectrum Sharing
The ever increasing density of IoT devices has posed grow-
ing demand for spectrum resources. Futures-based spectrum
resource trading is studied here between two different service
providers, as shown in Fig. 1. Each service provider is corre-
sponded to an access point (AP), such as a base station and a
Wi-Fi access point. With total bandwidth of W, the under-
utilized spectrum of the service provider (resource owner)
could sell its idle spectrum to the over-utilized service provider
(resource requester). The two sides determine the price p and
the amount rs for trading via a mutually forward contract for
future spectrum sharing.
Local  user
Local user
Local user
Local user
Local user
Spectrum 
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Spectrum 
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Fig. 1. Futures-based spectrum trading between two service providers.
C. Utility and Risk of the Spectrum Owner
The utility of the spectrum owner is the profit that can
be obtained, including the revenue from local user services,
the revenue from spectrum selling to the spectrum requester,
and the cost incurred by the performance degradation due to
spectrum sharing [9].
Ub(p, rs, nc) = c1nc + prs − c2nc
(
Breq − kc
W − rs
nc
)
, (1)
where nc is the number of local users served by spectrum
owners that influences the amount of available spectrum for
trading. Based on historical statistics, the value of nc can be
obtained. c1 and c2 are weights for the revenue from local
users and cost due to the performance degradation, respec-
tively. Breq and kc denote the required bandwidth and spectral
efficiency of wireless transmission for local user services. The
remaining spectrum for the local services is reduced due to
the resource sharing, resulting in performance degradation of
the network.
The risk of the spectrum owner comes from the prediction
uncertainty on the number of local user number nc, which is
defined as the probability that the ratio of the random utility
and its mean value E
[
Ub(p, rs, nc)
]
is less than a threshold ρb.
Rb(p, rb, nc) = prob
{
Ub(p, rs, nc)
E[Ub(p, rs, nc)]
≤ ρb
}
. (2)
The spectrum owner provides an acceptable tolerance for the
risk to reach the contract. Therefore, the objective of the
spectrum owner is to maximize its expected utility with the
constraint of the risk threshold of trading failure Tb, which is
max
p,rs
E
[
Ub(p, rs, nc)
]
s.t. Rb(p, rb, nc) ≤ Tb.
(3)
D. Utility and Risk of the Spectrum Requester
The utility of the spectrum requester includes spectrum
revenue and the payment for accessing the spectrum, which is
affected by the wireless transmission. The wireless transmis-
sion rate can be dynamically adjusted by adaptive modulation
based on the channel quality. Therefore, the utility of the
spectrum requester is expressed as [9]
Ud(p, rs, γ) = ωn log2(1 + kdrs) − prs, (4)
in which ω is the revenue weight, kd is the spectral efficiency.
The value of kd of the requester can be given as [9].
kd = log2(1 + Kγ), K =
1.5
ln(0.2/BERtar)
, (5)
where γ is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), which is a random
variable, and BERtar is the target bit-error-rate (BER).
When the SNR is too small, the utility that the requester
could earn may be negative and thus the contract cannot
be reached. Therefore, the minimum utility is set to zero to
guarantee the minimum QoS requirement.
Umind (p, rb, γ) = 0. (6)
The risk of the spectrum requester is incurred by the
prediction uncertainty of the randomness of the value of γ.
So it can be defined as the probability that the utility will be
too close to its minimum
Rd(p, rs, γ) = prob

Ud(p, rs, nc)
Umin
d
(p, rb, γ)
≤ 1 + ρd
 . (7)
Similarly, the spectrum requester also has a risk tolerance to
accept the contract. Therefore, the objective of the spectrum
requester is to maximize its expected utility with the constraint
of the risk threshold of trading failure Td, and is given as
max
p,rs
E
[
Ud(p, rs, γ)
]
s.t. Rd(p, rs, γ) ≤ Td.
(8)
3III. Contract Negotiation of the Price and Resource Amount
for Futures Based Trading
The price and amount for resource trading are negotiated
within the contract period, which can be predicted according
to the resource usage of the owner and requester. Noted that the
problem of the contract period is out of the scope of this letter.
The two sides only negotiate for the price and resource amount
of trading, which is performed in an iterative process, as shown
in Algorithm 1. In each iteration, the spectrum owner proposes
a contract price p and computes corresponding acceptable
amount range for trading based on its risk estimation. Upon
receiving the asking price, the spectrum requester performs its
risk analysis to identify an affordable range of trading amount.
If the two ranges overlap, the requester accepts the price at
the amount that maximize its utility. After all acceptable price
and amount pairs are found, the spectrum owner sets the final
contract price and amount pair for trading that maximizes its
utility. If there is no overlap after sufficient rounds of iterations,
the negotiation terminates, which means the trading fails.
Algorithm 1 Futures-based Pricing Algorithm
1: Require: The spectrum owner sets the minimum spectrum
price pmin and its risk of trading failure threshold Tb, the
spectrum requester sets its risk of trading failure threshold
Td .
2: Repeat:
3: The spectrum owner announces its price p and correspond-
ing range of trading amount rb under Tb accroding to (2).
4: The requester estimates its risk based on (7) and finds its
acceptable spectrum size range of rd under Td.
5: if rb and rd overlap then
6: The requester finds the spectrum amount r that maxi-
mizes its expected utility.
7: end if
8: The owner updates the price p = p + ∆p.
9: Until: rb and rd do not overlap.
10: The owner finds the optimal amount rop price pop among
all r that maximizes its expected utility from all acceptable
price and quantity of the requester.
11: Return: rop and pop.
IV. Simulation Results and Analysis
In the simulation, we set the total spectrum bandwidth W as
30MHz, the number of local users follows Poisson distribution
with average being 8. The required spectrum bandwidth of
each local user Breq is assumed as 1 MHz, the SNR follows
uniform distribution between 9 dB to 22 dB. Furthermore, the
risk threshold of the spectrum owner is set to 0.2.
A contract user obtains the spectrum according to the
forward contract, which indicates that there is no risk of
trading failure in the futures-based trading. However, the on-
site requester has risk of failure to access the resource due
to the competition with others. Therefore, the probability
of trading failure in the on-site trading is the same with
the performance improvement in the futures-based trading
scheme. Fig. 2 shows the probability of trading failure in the
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Fig. 2. Probability of trading failure comparison between the proposed
futures-based trading scheme and on-site trading mechanism.
on-site trading scheme [10], where the probability of trading
failure is 0 at the beginning and then steps up with increasing
number of local users. This can be mainly attributed to the fact
that the available spectrum is sufficient for trading when there
are a few local connections. However, the available spectrum
cannot meet the QoS requirement of the on-site requester
compared to the contract user when the number of local users
continues to increase.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of profit of the owner between the on-site and the
proposed futures-based trading mechanism.
As shown in Fig. 3, the futures-based trading achieves
higher profit compared to that in the on-site trading in most
cases. The profit increases faster at the beginning, while the
gap between the two trading schemes becomes smaller. This
indicates that the punishment is small when there are a small
number of local users. The available spectrum for trading is
decreased with increased local users, leading to slower growth
for spectrum utilization. In contrast, the futures-based trading
scheme shows worse performance than the on-site trading
mechanism as the number of local users continues to increase.
4The trading fairness can be reflected by the stability of the
spectrum revenue, which is related to the allocated spectrum
size and spectrum efficiency.We define that the trading fairness
is reciprocal of the variance of the spectrum revenue.
F =
1
var(log2(1 + kdrs))
. (9)
From the above equation, we can observe that the larger
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Fig. 4. Spectrum price in the on-site and futures-based trading.
fluctuation of the amount for trading will introduce the worse
fairness. In fact, the fluctuation of the spectrum quantity is
affected by the variation of the price. Fig. 4 shows the spectrum
price of the futures-based and the on-site spectrum trading. It
can be seen futures-based spectrum price remains constant,
whereas the price in on-site trading fluctuates significantly.
Furthermore, spectrum price in the futures-based trading is
almost lower than that in the on-site trading. The reason is
that the generally insufficient spectrum results in higher on-
site price in most cases compared to the contract price which
is determined by statistics. In addition, the latency-sensitive
application may be charged more than the reasonable price
when the competition among the on-site spectrum requesters is
fierce under the spectrum scarcity, giving rise to unfair trading.
The trading fairness of the proposed futures-based scheme
remains almost constant and is higher than that of the on-
site trading mechanism in most cases, as shown in Fig. 5.
This is because the spectrum amount for trading has been
fixed through a forward contract. In contrast, the spectrum
availability in the on-site trading is based on dynamic spectrum
requester and local user numbers. The fairness of the on-site
trading shows a change of trend from rise to decline with the
increasing number of on-site requesters. The reason is that
the available spectrum resource is greater than demand when
the number of on-site requesters is small, leading to unfair
trading to the spectrum owners. The spectrum is less than
the overall demand and the spectrum access competition is
intensified with the growth of on-site requesters. The trading
is unfair to the spectrum requesters in this situation.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of trading fairness of the on-site and futures-based trading
scheme.
V. Conclusion
A futures-based resource trading scheme for real-time IoT
networks is proposed to address the risk of trading failure
and unfairness associated with the on-site trading. To achieve
the futures-based trading, a resource requester and a resource
owner sign a mutually beneficial forward contract, in which
the risk of trading failure based on the statistics of available
resource and demand is taken into account. With the proposed
trading mechanism, a contract user obtains the resource im-
mediately at the agreed price without the on-site negotiation
delay. Simulation results confirm that the proposed futures-
based resource trading outperforms the on-site resource trading
in terms of trading success rate and fairness.
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